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1 Introduction
The paper provides a theory of equilibrium wages in a continuous-time search
model with random matching and heterogeneous labor. Workers di¤er in pro-
ductivity (skills). Employers are identical and value worker?s skills in similar
manner. As in conventional search and matching models (Mortensen and Pis-
sarides, 1994; Pissarides, 2000), agents meet pairwise and bargain over the terms
of trade. Instead of Nash bargaining, however, we develop an alternative price
formation method which is an extension of the earlier work by Kultti (2000)
and Kultti and Virrankoski (2004). The novelty in the approach is that, in the
case of disagreement, trading partners do not have to separate forever but may
choose to maintain the existing contact and continue search besides the ongoing
meeting. Once either of the parties locates another trading partner, transaction
is concluded via auction between the two competing agents. If the new agent
is another employer, the two employer candidates bid for the sole worker. If
it is the employer who locates another worker candidate, the competing work-
ers lower their wage demands until the less skilled is driven to his reservation
utility level. Upon the initial pairwise meetings, employers can propose wage
o¤ers unilaterally. It is shown that employers? equilibrium strategy is to o¤er a
wage that is just good enough to prevent the worker from exercising his search
option. The wage is unique to each skill level.
Two observations about the trading process are immediate. First, the set-
ting allows for the possibility of competition between alike agents even though
the initial matching is pairwise. The model thus resembles the ?urn-ball? process
(e.g. Butters, 1977; Hall, 1979) where multiple simultaneous contacts are pos-
sible and auctions are a standard price formation practice (e.g. Julien et al.,
2000). However, since our construction features at most two bidders at any
auction, the introduction of worker heterogeneity is more tractable than in the
urn-ball model where the number of di¤erent bidders at some auctions can be
unlimited. Secondly, the search option generates a sharing rule that secures at
least some rents also to the worker, so that the model circumvents the Diamond
Paradox1.
1 Diamond (1971) demonstrated that in a pairwise matching model where one of the traders
can set the price unilaterally leads to an equilibrium where the price setter captures all the
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It turns out that the search option is disproportionately valuable for high
skilled workers. This is because high skilled workers are better protected against
competition. In a situation where there are two workers competing for the same
vacancy, the better skilled worker must lower his wage demand only to the level
that secures the employer the same rent as would be available when hiring the
less skilled worker at his reservation wage. In fact, we show that the better
skilled earns his reservation utility plus the whole value of the productivity
gap between him and the less skilled colleague. This disparity leads to a non-
linear wage structure: More skilled workers earn strictly larger fraction of the
transferable rent than less skilled workers.
In models with Nash bargaining it is assumed that the transferable rent is
shared according to some exogenous sharing rule. If worker heterogeneity is
incorporated into these models, our result suggests that the sharing rule should
not be constant throughout the worker types. Otherwise the resulting wage
schedule is linear (e.g. Rosen and Wasmer, 2005), as opposed to the convex
pattern in our setting.
The equilibrium wage dispersion is decreasing with the discount rate, which
captures the severeness of the search frictions in the labor market. The reason
behind this result is that when the discount rate is low agents are relatively
patient and workers? ?wait-and-search? option is more valuable. Since this op-
tion is disproportionately valuable for high skilled workers, also the overall wage
dispersion is higher when the discount rate is low. Regarding the e¤ect of labor
market tightness on equilibrium wage structure, we show that an increase in the
ratio of vacant jobs and the number of unemployed always leads to an increase
in lower tail wage di¤erentials. In the upper tail, however, the relationship is
ambiguous. When the labor market is su¢ciently tight initially, a marginal
increase in labor demand tends to widen the upper tail wage di¤erentials. How-
ever, when the market is ?slack? ex ante, increasing demand actually compresses
upper tail wages. This is because a marginal increase in demand dilutes part of
the high skilled workers? comparative advantage when vacant jobs are the short
side of the market. Our numerical examples indicate, however, that the overall
wage dispersion is increasing with labor market tightness.
transferable rent.
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We also show that a mean preserving spread in the skill distribution is asso-
ciated with greater wage dispersion. This is because a mean preserving spread
increases the lower tail wage di¤erentials more than it reduces the wage gaps
in the upper tail. There is a host of evidence indicating that countries where
workers? skills are more polarized tend to have higher wage dispersion, too (e.g.
Blackburn et al., 1991, and Devroye and Freeman, 2001).
A rise in the average skill level, in turn, has divergent short-run and long-run
e¤ects. In the short-run, an increase in the mean skill level creates a negative
externality on all wages due to its positive externality on ?rms? outside option
(cf. Rosen and Wasmer, 2005). The e¤ect is especially dramatic for workers
in the lower tail of the skill distribution as their market value may collapse
completely, but also the upper tail wages become more compressed. As the
market adjusts to a new long-run steady state, the vacancy-unemployment ra-
tio is increased and employers are willing to trade with all workers. Greater
market tightness then widens wage di¤erentials and thereby counterbalances
the negative externality of improved worker productivity on short-run wages.
A number of empirical studies (cf. Katz and Autor, 1999, for an overview) re-
veal the puzzling trend that a substantial growth in the relative supply of skilled
labor has in most industrialized economies been accompanied by increasing ?skill
premium? in wages. Our short-run analysis suggests that an increase in the frac-
tion of high skilled labor should reduce that premium. In the long-run, however,
the positive labor demand e¤ect tends to widen wage di¤erentials across skill
levels. Moreover, if there is a general upgrade in productivity, non-linear wage
structure implies that workers with higher skills gain disproportionately. Our
theory thus mitigates the need for strong skill-biased technological change (e.g.
Katz et al., 1993, Katz and Autor, 1999, and Krusell et al. 2000) to explain the
simultaneous increase in the both supply and price of skilled labor.
Meckl and Zink (2002) point out that the wage di¤erentials by skill groups
have actually evolved non-monotonically. The time path of the relative wage has
typically been U-shaped in a sense that wage di¤erentials by skills fell during the
1970s, and started to increase only during the 1980s and 1990s. The U-shaped
time path suggests that the upgrading of skills may have overrun the demand
e¤ect and the pace of technological progress in the 1970s while the pattern would
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have been reversed during the 1980s and the 1990s. Indeed, according to Katz
and Autor (1999), the relative supply of skilled labor rose most in the 1970s.
2 The model
2.1 Basic set up
The labor market is populated by a continuum of unemployed workers and a
larger continuum of ?rms who post open vacancies. Workers di¤er in produc-
tivity (skills) which is measured by a continuous index x 2 [x; x]. Workers are
distributed over this productivity interval according to the distribution function
F (x). Firms are identical, have similar valuation for the labor input and have
a unit demand for labor. Irrespective to the skill level, all unemployed have a
unit supply of labor and they value their work e¤ort at zero.
Trading takes place in private meetings between unemployed workers and
?rms. In order to locate a potential employer, workers must commit to a search
process. Search e¤ort is costless but time-consuming2 which creates frictions on
the functioning of the market. The frequency at which ?rms receive applications
and unemployed workers locate vacant jobs is governed by an exogenous match-
ing function, M (u; v), that gives the total number of matches at each point of
time as a function of two inputs, the number of currently unemployed (u) and
the number of vacant jobs (v). As usual, the matching function is assumed to
be strictly increasing and strictly concave in both arguments and it exhibits
constant returns to scale.
Since time is continuous, Poisson arrival rates can be used to measure the
?ow probabilities of locating (receiving) a vacant job (an application). An un-
employed worker locates an open vacancy at rate ® while a ?rm with an un?lled
vacancy receives an application from an unemployed worker at rate ¯: Pairwise
matching requires ®u = ¯v = M (u; v).
Labor market tightness, µ = v=u, is the ratio between open vacancies and
unemployed workers. The CRS-property of the matching function implies that
the meeting rates ® and ¯ can be determined as a function of labor market
2 Having direct search costs would introduce just another friction to the search process.
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tightness:
® =
M (u; v)
u
´ µm (µ) and ¯ = M (u; v)
v
´ m (µ) ; (1)
where m (µ) = M(1=µ; 1). The strict concavity of the matching function M
implies that m (µ) is decreasing and convex in µ. Thus, increasing labor mar-
ket tightness improves (reduces) the rate at which unemployed workers (?rms)
locate vacant jobs (receive applications); i.e. ®0(µ) = @ [µm(µ)] =@µ > 0 and
¯0(µ) = m0(µ) < 0. For notational convenience, we continue to denote the meet-
ing rates by ® and ¯. In a long-run steady state, market tightness - and thereby
the meeting rates ® and ¯ - are endogenously determined.
Opening a vacancy incurs a ?ow cost denoted by Á, which can be thought to
capture all the other factors of production except the worker. Under unrestricted
entry, ?rms open new vacancies until the present value of the expected future
pro?ts from a ?lled vacancy equal the present value of the ?ow cost, ©. New
unemployed workers are born at a constant and exogenous rate ´. Steady state
requires that ®u = ´.3 Labor contracts are lifelong relationships so that, after a
successful match, both the hired worker and the ?lled vacancy exit the market
forever. A long-run steady state equilibrium (i.e. steady state values for u,
v, and µ) is completely determined by the pairwise matching condition, ?rms?
free-entry condition and the exogenous ?birth rate? of new unemployed.
2.2 Trading
The trading process postulated here is an extension of the models by Kultti
(2000) and Kultti and Virrankoski (2004), the key di¤erence being the assump-
tion of heterogeneous sellers (=unemployed workers). Upon a meeting with a
worker, the employer proposes a wage o¤er. If trading seems unfavorable for
the worker, he does not have to break up the contact completely but he may
opt to wait and continue search besides the ongoing meeting. If the worker de-
cides to wait, he locates another employer at rate ®. In that case, two employer
candidates raise their wage o¤ers until driven to their reservation utilities. On
the other hand, at rate ¯ the employer contacts another unemployed and there
3 This assumption replaces the exogenous job destruction typically assumed in the
Mortensen-Pissarides model.
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will be two competing workers. The workers reduce their wage demands until
either (or both) of them rather leaves the meeting than further lowers the wage
demand. Figure 1 depicts the timing of events.
The ?wait-and-search? option is the only trump card in worker?s hands. If he
did not have that, the employer could propose a wage o¤er that would make the
worker indi¤erent between accepting the o¤er and staying unemployed. With
no unemployment bene?ts, that practice would lead to an equilibrium where
all workers earn zero wages while the employer keeps all rents; i.e. we would
have the Diamond Paradox. It turns out that the search option guarantees the
worker a payo¤ that is generally greater than his reservation utility, so that the
Diamond Paradox does not emerge in our setting.
Employer?s equilibrium strategy is to propose a wage o¤er that is just good
enough to prevent the worker from using his search option so that no worker
ever opts to wait and continue search. The bold arrows in Figure 1 depict the
?equilibrium path? while the dashed arrows represent the ?o¤-equilibrium paths?.
As in Kultti and Virrankoski (2004), the construction of the equilibrium is based
on the following conjecture:
Conjecture 1 (i) If the employer o¤ers a wage that produces the worker less
utility than the value of the waiting option, the worker rather waits than leaves
the meeting. (ii) Instead of terminating the meeting immediately, the employer
is willing to trade at equilibrium wages with any worker - regardless of the skill
level of the worker. (iii) If the unemployed worker decides to wait and continue
search, then transaction is concluded once a competing agent appears in either
side of the negotiation table; i.e. there will be no ?further waiting?.
The ?rst part of the Conjecture 1 is rather obvious, since the worst scenario
in the wait-and-search option is that the worker is driven to his reservation
utility level - which is the utility he gets if he opts to discard the initial contact
immediately. The second part will hold by assumption. If it did not hold for
some low skilled workers, those workers would not have the search option besides
the ongoing meeting and could earn at most zero wages. We assume that this
is not possible in a long-run steady state but those low skilled workers would
be driven out of the market. It turns out that it su¢ces to assume that the
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F and E(x’) meet
F makes a
’take-it-or-
leave-it’ offer
E(x’) responds
Meeting
breaks up
Accepts
Transaction
concluded
Meeting
breaks up
E(x’) waits
Rejects
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at rate ? Two Fsà
auction
E(x’)&E(x’’)à
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F = firm, E(x’) = employee with skills x’
at rate ?
Transaction
concluded
Further
waiting
Further
waiting
Figure 1: Timing of events
present value of the future output ?ow generated by the least able worker, X,
at least equals with the present value of the costs, ©. The third part states that
even though the workers would have unlimited possibilities to wait and search,
transactions will be concluded immediately after either another employer has
been located or another worker candidate has shown up. This will also be shown
to hold in equilibrium. Hence, according to Conjecture 1, the ?thin? dashed lines
in Figure 1 describe irrelevant o¤-equilibrium paths.
2.3 The Bellman equations
Both workers and ?rms are risk neutral and discount their future earnings with
a common discount rate r: Assume that the equilibrium wage available for the
worker possessing skills x0 is w(x0). Given the equilibrium wages, the discounted
value of an open vacancy is denoted by V0 while the discounted value of a job
?lled with a worker with skills x0 is denoted by V (x0). The discounted value of
being unemployed is denoted by U0(x0) and of being employed by U(x0).
Under linear preferences, U(x0) yields
U(x0) =
1Z
¿
e¡(t¡¿)rw(x0)dt =
w(x0)
r
; 8x0 2 [x; x] : (2)
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E(x’), E(x’’) s.t. x’’=x’ and F
at the meeting; E(x’) lowers his
wage demand until driven to U0(x’)
E(x’), E(x’’) s.t. x’’<x’ and F
at the meeting; E(x’) earns
Û(x’)= X’-X’’+ U0(x’’)
1-F(x’)
E(x’) and two Fs at the meeting;
Fs engage in an auction à
E(x’) earns X’-V0
E(x’) waits
f(x’’)
F(x’)
Figure 2: Wait-and-search option
The discounted value of unemployment U0(x0); in turn, can be expressed as
rU0(x
0) = ® (U(x0) ¡ U0(x0)) ; ,
U0(x
0) =
®
® + r
U(x0): (3)
Similarly, the present value of a ?lled job reads as
V (x0) =
x0 ¡ w(x0)
r
; 8x0 2 [x; x] ; (4)
while the expected value of a newly opened vacancy yields
V0 =
¯
¯ + r
xZ
x
V (x)dF (x): (5)
For convenience, we de?ne X 0 ´ x0=r. In a long-run steady state under unre-
stricted entry, V0 = © ´ Á=r.
2.4 The wage function
Consider a meeting between an employer and a worker with skills x0. Figure
2 illustrates the prospects of the worker if he decides to reject the employer?s
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o¤er and start searching for alternative contacts. If the worker manages to
locate another employer, which happens at rate ®, two competing ?rms engage
in an auction for the right to hire the worker; i.e. ?rms raise their bids until
the utility from hiring equals their expected reservation utility, V0. However, if
another worker happens to show up (which occurs at rate ¯), the resulting wage
will depend on whether the newcomer is at least equally skilled or less skilled
than the incumbent worker.
Assume ?rst that the appearing rival is labeled with a skill level x00 < x0.
Then the less skilled competitor lowers his wage demand until he gets U0 (x00).
The better skilled incumbent knows that his rival?s lowest acceptable wage will
provide the employer with a discounted value equal to
V C (x00) = x00 ¡ U0 (x00) ;
where X 00 = x00=r and the upper index c stands for competition between workers.
If the incumbent worker wants to trade, he needs to propose a wage demand
that produces the employer at least the same utility; i.e. V C (x0) = V C (x00).
Denote the incumbent worker?s utility from such a contract by U^ (x0 p x00). Then
the highest wage the incumbent worker with skills x0 is able to demand must
satisfy the following condition:
X0 ¡ U^ (x0 p x00) = X 00 ¡ U0 (x00) ;
so that
U^ (x0 p x00) = U0 (x00) + X 0 ¡ X 00, 8x0 ¸ x00: (6)
Yet another conjecture, which will be shown to hold in equilibrium, guarantees
that the better skilled worker is willing to trade at a competitive situation:
Conjecture 2 U^ (x0 p x00) > U0 (x0) :
On the other hand, with probability 1¡F (x0) we have 8x0 · x00 so that the
arriving competitor is at least equally skilled as the incumbent worker and the
incumbent is driven to his reservation utility level U0 (x0) :
Summarizing this lengthy description with a single equation, the Bellman
equation representing the value of the ?wait-and-search? option faced by a worker
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with skills x0 reads as
rh(x0) = ® (X 0 ¡ V0 ¡ h(x0))+¯[(1 ¡ F (x0)) U0 (x0)+
x0Z
x
U^ (x0 p x) dF (x)¡h(x0)];
(7)
where the ?rst term on the right-hand side captures the chance of ending up to
a situation with two competing employers whereas the second term re?ects the
expected utility available when another worker happens to show up.
Since the initiative is on the employer?s side, the equilibrium wage o¤er
proposed upon a meeting is such that it makes the worker indi¤erent between
accepting the o¤er and exercising the search option. Therefore the equilibrium
wages for any skill level x0 2 [x; x] satisfy
U (x0) = h(x0) , w(x0) = rh(x0): (8)
The wage at which the transaction is concluded is unique for every x0 2 [x; x].
Uniqueness follows as (8) is linear in w(x) and has a unique solution.
Substituting w(x) for rh(x) in (7) and di¤erentiating with respect to x gives
w0(x) =
(® + r) (® + F (x)¯)
(® + r)2 + F (x)¯® + ¯r
´ Ã (x) < 1; (9)
where Ã (x) is the share of the marginal productivity gain that goes to the
worker with skills x. Ã (x) < 1 implies that the worker can never capture all the
transferable rent. This is because the employer has the ?rst-mover advantage.
Using this formula, and remembering that in a long-run steady state V0 =
© ´ Á=r, we can derive the steady state equilibrium wages as a function of
worker?s skill level x:
Lemma 3 The equilibrium wage function is given by
w(x0) =
x0Z
x
Ã(x)dx + w (x) ;8x0 2 [x; x]
where
w (x) =
® (® + r)
(® + r)
2
+ ¯r
(x ¡ Á)
is the wage earned by the least able worker in the market.
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Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Lemma 4 Conjectures 1-2 hold in an equilibrium established by the wage sched-
ule given in (8).
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Since Ã (x) is increasing with F (x) and F 0 (x) > 0, w00(x) > 0 so that
Proposition 5 The wage function is non-linear and convex; i.e. worker?s share
of the matching surplus is increasing with skills.
Thus, our ?quasi-competitive? setting produces a non-linear pricing rule, even
though the buyer?s preferences are homogeneous, there are no informational
frictions or active market segmentation. The non-linearity of wages stems from
the disparity in the values of the wait-and-search options between di¤erent skill
levels. This disparity is probably most transparently visible in equation (7) (or
in Figure 2): The wait-and-search option is the more valuable the less there
are equally or better skilled candidates among unemployed workers. This is
because the expected utility available from trading in a situation when there
are two competing workers and one employer is the larger the smaller is the
probability of having a better skilled competitor.
In models where Nash bargaining is applied, the transferable rent is divided
according to an exogenous sharing rule. Our result suggests that if one wants
to introduce heterogeneity into these models, the sharing rule should not be
constant throughout di¤erent types. Otherwise the resulting price function is
linear. This is easy to see in the current case. the sharing rule obtained under
generalized Nash bargaining can be written as
(1 ¡ ½) (U(x) ¡ U0(x)) = ½ (V (x) ¡ ©) ; (10)
where ½ (1 ¡ ½) denotes worker?s (employer?s) exogenous ?bargaining power?.
Utilizing equations (2), (3) and (4), equation (10) implies
wNB(x) =
½ (® + r)
½® + r
(x ¡ Á) ;
so that Nash wages are linearly increasing with the worker skill level x.
We also report two comparative static results. First,
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Proposition 6 The equilibrium wage dispersion is a decreasing function of the
discount rate r.
Proof. Follows directly from the observation that @Ã (x) =@r < 0.
The reason behind this result is that when r is low agents are relatively
patient and workers? wait-and-search option more valuable. Since this option
is disproportionately valuable to high skilled workers, also the overall wage dis-
persion is higher when r is low.
Secondly,
Proposition 7 (i) The lower tail wage di¤erentials increase along with greater
labor market tightness. (ii) If
®0 (µ) + ¯0 (µ) > 0;
then a marginal increase in market tightness increases the upper tail wage dif-
ferentials. Otherwise, the upper tail wages become more compressed.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Greater labor market tightness means that there are more available jobs per
one unemployed worker so that it becomes easier for the unemployed to locate
a potential employer; i.e. ® increases. This fact generally increases the value of
the wait-and-search option because higher ® means greater probability of having
two employers competing for the same worker. In such an occasion high skilled
workers bene?t disproportionately and wage di¤erentials tend to increase. This
prediction is in line with some earlier models (e.g. Acemoglu, 1997) as well as
with empirical evidence (e.g. DiNardo et al., 1996). However, greater market
tightness also reduces the rate at which ?rms receive applications (¯) which
lowers the probability of having two workers competing for the same vacancy.
Since high skilled workers are better protected against competition, increasing
market tightness also dilutes their comparative advantage. If this e¤ect is strong
enough, the upper tail wages may actually become more compressed. This is the
case if a marginal increase in µ worsens the congestion on employers? side more
than it increases the contact probability on workers? side, i.e. when vacant jobs
are the short side of the market or
¯¯
¯0 (µ)
¯¯
> ®0 (µ). Our numerical examples in
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the Appendix indicate, however, that the overall wage dispersion is likely to be
increasing with µ.
3 Distribution of skills, technical change and the
wage structure
Consider ?rst a mean preserving spread in the distribution of skills. Since the
expected value of a ?lled vacancy remains unchanged, a mean preserving spread
a¤ects steady state wages only by changing workers? relative position in the
labor market. We obtain
Proposition 8 A mean preserving spread in the distribution of skills leads to
greater wage dispersion.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
This result is due to the feature that Ã (x) is increasing but concave in F .
In other words, a mean preserving spread in the skill distribution F increases
the lower tail wage di¤erentials more than it reduces the wage gaps in the upper
tail. As a result, the overall wage dispersion becomes wider. There is a host of
evidence indicating that countries where workers? skills are more polarized tend
to have higher wage dispersion, too (e.g. Blackburn et al., 1991, and Devroye
and Freeman, 2001).
On the other hand, any changes in the mean skill level not only a¤ect work-
ers? relative ?bargaining power? but also ?rm?s incentives to open new vacancies.
For example, a rise in the mean skill level increases the expected value of a
?lled vacancy, encouraging more frequent market entry by ?rms. Therefore a
long-run steady state with higher average worker productivity should feature
greater market tightness and lower unemployment.
It is instructive, however, to ?rst consider the short run consequences of an
increase in average worker skills, before the labor market converges on a new
long-run steady state. In the short-run analysis, we keep market tightness µ
?xed. It may then happen that the value of having an un?lled vacancy exceeds
the value of hiring a worker with lower skill level than some threshold x^; i.e. for
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x 2 [x; x^) V0 > V (x). Obviously, these workers do not possess the wait-and-
search option because any hesitation would trigger the employer to disregard the
candidate immediately. Since there are no other outside options, the Diamond
paradox tells us that workers with skills x 2 [x; x^) can earn at most zero wages
while the employers keep all the surplus. Moreover, if rV0 > x, the employer
refuses to trade at all. Assuming that V0 = V (x^), the wages for x0 2 [x^; ¹x] are
given by w(x0) =
Z x0
x^
Ã(x)dx:
Thus, in the short-run, an increase in the average skill level creates a negative
externality on wages due to its positive externality on ?rms? outside option (cf.
Rosen and Wasmer, 2005). The e¤ect is especially dramatic for workers in the
lower tail of the skill distribution - i.e. for x 2 [x; x^) - as their market value
collapses completely. Since Ã(x) is increasing with F (x), also wages for x 2 [x^; ¹x]
become more compressed.
As the labor market adjusts to a new long-run steady state, so that the free-
entry condition V0 = © < x=r is again satis?ed, employers are willing to trade
with all workers and the vacancy-unemployment ratio is increased. Greater mar-
ket tightness is shown to widen wage di¤erentials at least on the lower tail of the
skill distribution. Our numerical examples indicate that the same is true also for
the overall wage dispersion. In the long-run the positive demand e¤ect thereby
counterbalances the negative externality of improved worker productivity in the
short-run.
Many empirical studies (cf. Katz and Autor, 1999, for an overview) reveal
the puzzling trend that a substantial growth in the relative supply of skilled
labor has in most industrialized economies been accompanied by increasing ?skill
premium? in wages. Our short-run analysis also suggests that an increase in
the fraction of high skilled labor should reduce that premium. In the long-run,
however, there are potentially two counterbalancing e¤ects: First, an increase in
the average skill level of the labor force stimulates labor demand, which tends
to widen wage di¤erentials across skill levels. Secondly, if there is a general
upgrade in productivity, say by a factor ¸, the non-linearity of wages implies that
workers with higher skills gain disproportionately. Thus, even if the distribution
of skills would be transformed to weight higher skill levels, wage dispersion may
14
still increase, if the positive demand e¤ect and a possible concurrent upgrade in
labor productivity are large enough.
A number of studies (e.g. Katz et al., 1993, Katz and Autor, 1999, and
Krusell et al. 2000) indicate that skill-biased technological change has to be
the key factor explaining the rise in the skill premium. The results in our
model, however, mitigate the need for strong skill-biased technological change
to explain the simultaneous increase in the both supply and price of skilled
labor. Meckl and Zink (2002) point out that the wage di¤erentials by skill
groups have actually evolved non-monotonically. The time path of the relative
wage has typically been U-shaped in a sense that wage di¤erentials by skills
fell during the 1970s, and started to increase only during the 1980s and 1990s.
The U-shaped time path suggests that the upgrading of skills may have overrun
the demand e¤ect and the pace of technological progress in the 1970s while
the pattern would have been reversed during the 1980s and the 1990s. Indeed,
according to Katz and Autor (1999), the relative supply of skilled labor rose
most in the 1970s.
4 Concluding remarks
The paper studies wage formation in a pairwise matching model under worker
heterogeneity. Upon a private meeting, the employer proposes a wage o¤er to
the worker candidate. If the worker is not satis?ed with the o¤er, he can opt
to wait and search for an alternative employer but still maintain the existing
contact. At the same time, however, the worker runs a risk that a competing
worker approaches the employer. Once a rival agent appears in either side
of the negotiation table, an auction is triggered between the competing agents.
Employer?s equilibrium strategy is to propose a wage o¤er that just prevents the
worker from exercising his wait-and-search option. The resulting wage function
is non-linear in a sense that more skilled workers earn strictly larger fraction
of the transferable rent than less skilled workers. The wait-and-search option
anyhow guarantees at least some rents to all workers, so that the model resolves
the Diamond Paradox.
The equilibrium wage dispersion is decreasing with the discount rate. This
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is because lower discount rate increases the value of workers? wait-and-search
option, leading to a disproportionate rise in high skilled workers? wages. The
relationship between market tightness and wage di¤erentials is unambiguously
positive at lower tail skill levels. In the upper tail, however, the relationship may
be reversed if vacant jobs are the short side of the market. The reason behind
this ambiguity is that an increase in labor demand dilutes part of the high skilled
workers? comparative advantage. Our numerical examples indicate, however,
that the overall wage dispersion is increasing with labor market tightness.
It is shown that a mean preserving spread in the skill distribution leads to
greater wage dispersion. This prediction is supported by empirical evidence (e.g.
Blackburn et al., 1991, and Devroye and Freeman, 2001). An increase in the
mean skill level, in turn, has very divergent short-run and long-run e¤ects. In the
short-run, a rise in the average worker productivity creates a negative externality
on wages due to its positive externality on ?rms? outside options. This e¤ect is
especially dramatic for workers in the lower tail of the skill distribution as their
market value may completely collapse. In the long-run, however, higher average
productivity stimulates market entry by ?rms, improving workers? position in
the market and widening wage gaps.
The long-run demand e¤ect and the non-linearity of wages can together help
to understand the widely recognized ?skill premium puzzle?. As high skilled
workers are able to gain disproportionately from a general upgrade in produc-
tivity, a strong skill-biased technological change might not be needed to explain
the simultaneous increase in the both supply and price of skilled labor.
Appendix
A Proofs
A.1 Lemma 3
Proof. Start with deriving the wage rate for the least skilled worker. For x0 = x
eq. (7) reads as
rh(x) = ® (X0 ¡ V0 ¡ h(x)) + ¯(U0 (x) ¡ h(x0)):
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Using (2) and (3) and substituting w(x) for rh(x) gives
® + ¯ + r
r
w(x) = ®(X 0 ¡ V0) + ¯®
(® + r) r
w(x) ,
w(x) =
® (® + r)
(® + r)2 + ¯r
(x ¡ Á) :
By (9) we know that
w0(x) =
(® + r) (® + F (x)¯)
(® + r)2 + F (x)¯® + ¯r
= Ã (x) :
Integrating both sides yields
w(x) =
Z
Ã (x) dx + c ´ ª(x) + c:
Now the constant can be solved using w(x):
c = w(x) ¡ ª(x):
Hence, the wage rate for any other skill level x0 2 [x; x] is given by
w(x0) = ª(x0) ¡ ª(x) + w(x) =
x0Z
x
Ã (x) dx + w(x).
A.2 Lemma 4
Proof. Let us start with showing that Conjecture 2 holds. Assume x0 > x00.
Then
U^ (x0 p x00) = U0 (x00) + X 0 ¡ X 00
=
®
® + r
x00Z
x
Ã (x)
r
dx +
w(x)
r
+ X 0 ¡ X 00:
On the other hand
U0 (x
0) =
®
® + r
x0Z
x
Ã (x)
r
dx +
w(x)
r
;
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so that
U^ (x0 p x00) ¡ U0 (x0) = 1
r
[x0 ¡ x00 ¡ ®
® + r
x0Z
x00
Ã (x) dx];
which is greater than zero because Ã (x) < 1 8x 2 [x; x]. Hence U^ (x0 p x00) >
U0 (x
0) and Conjecture 2 holds.
Conjecture 1, part (i): The worker with skills x0 prefers waiting if h(x0) ¸
U0(x0). The value of the wait-and-search option
rh(x0) = ® (X 0 ¡ V0 ¡ h(x0))+¯[(1 ¡ F (x0)) U0 (x0)+
x0Z
x
U^ (x0 p x) dF (x)¡h(x0)]
is a ?weighted? average of scenarios X 0 ¡ V0, U0 (x0) and
Z x0
x
U^ (x0 p x) dF (x).
Since by Conjecture 2 U^ (x0 p x00) > U0 (x0) 8x0 > x00; x0; x00 2 [x; x], we know
that
Z x0
x
U^ (x0 p x) dF (x) > U0 (x0). On the other hand,
X0 ¡ V0 = X 0 ¡ X + (X ¡ V0) > U^ (x0 p x) ,
because (X ¡ V0) > w(x). Therefore X0 ¡ V0 > U0 (x0), so that earning U0 (x0)
is the worst scenario in worker?s wait-and-search option, which directly implies
that h(x0) ¸ U0(x0).
Part (ii): Employers are willing to trade at the equilibrium wage if 8x0 2
[x; x] V (x0) ¸ V0. Assume x0 > x00. V (x0) > V (x00) because
V (x0) ¡ V (x00) = X0 ¡ X00 ¡ (U(x0) ¡ U(x00))
=
1
r
[x0 ¡ x00 ¡
x0Z
x00
Ã (x) dx] > 0;
since Ã (x) < 1. Therefore it su¢ces to show that V (x) ¸ V0 = ©.
V (x) =
x
r
¡ U(x) = x
r
¡ ® (® + r)
(® + r)2 + ¯r
³x
r
¡ ©
´
;
which is greater than © if x ¸ r© = Á.
Part (iii): Assume an unemployed worker has received a wage o¤er and
decided to wait and search for alternative contacts. We next go through all
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the possible scenarios, starting from the situation where the unemployed has
located another employer.
2 employers & 1 worker: By Bertrand argument we know that the employers
raise their wage o¤ers until driven to their reservation values. If the unemployed
did not accept the highest o¤er but opted to search even more contacts, the best
can happen is that another employer is located. A third bidder, however, would
not increase the highest available bid. On the other hand, there is a possibility
that the competing ?rms receive applications from other unemployed workers.
Since there is no upside potential but only a downside risk, the ?incumbent?
worker does not want to wait any further but concludes transaction.
1 employer & 2 workers : The second possibility is that the incumbent worker
with skills x0 ?nds himself competing with a rival worker candidate labeled
with skills x00. Assume x0 > x00, so that the newcomer could earn U0 (x00) and
the incumbent U^ (x0 p x00). Consider ?rst the possibility that a third worker
candidate with skills x000 is to appear. If x0 > x00 > x000, then the toughest
competition would still take place between the incumbent worker and the second
candidate, and they would earn U^ (x0 p x00) and U0 (x00) respectively. If x000 > x00;
the second candidate would ?drop out? and still earn U0 (x00) while the incumbent
would earn U^ (x0 p x000) < U^ (x0 p x00), if x000 < x0, or U0 (x00), if x000 ¸ x0, so that
the incumbent would be strictly worse-o¤. Hence the possibility of a third worker
candidate arriving induces a downside risk. Then we need to show that there is
no upside potential either. The better skilled incumbent locates an alternative
employer at rate ®. Then the reservation value for the ?rst employer is the case
where it is left alone with the second worker candidate; i.e. the employer can
trade at a wage that produces X 00¡U (x00). Therefore the highest available wage
rate for the incumbent as a result of the bidding game between the employers
satis?es ~U(x0) = U (x00) + X 0 ¡ X 00. However, the present value of this o¤er is
~U0(x
0) = U0 (x00) + ®= (® + r) (X 0 ¡ X 00) < U^ (x0 p x00) ;
so that there is no upside potential available for the incumbent from further
search. By the similar reasoning the highest utility the less skilled worker could
earn by further waiting is ~U(x00) = U (x)0 ¡ (X 0 ¡ X 00). The present value
of this scenario is less than the utility available from immediate trading, i.e.
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~U0(x
00) < U0 (x00). This can be veri?es by examining
~U0(x
00) ¡ U0 (x00) = ®
® + r
x0Z
x00
Ã (x)
r
dx ¡ X
0 ¡ X 00
r
;
which is a negative number because Ã (x) < 1.
We have now veri?ed that workers of any type cannot gain from further
search in a situation where there are two competing workers and a single em-
ployer. In fact, further waiting and search would make any worker strictly worse
o¤. This observation, in turn, implies that if the single employer did not accept
the lowest wage demand, both workers would be better o¤ by leaving the em-
ployer. As the single worker rationally expects this, he infers that he is better
o¤ by accepting the lowest wage demand.
Points a) and b) together imply that trading will take place once a compet-
itive situation is triggered on either employers? or workers? side.
A.3 Proposition 7
Proof. Since ® = µm(µ) and ¯ = m(µ), Ã(x) can be written as
Ã(x) =
K(µ) (µ + F (x))
K(µ)2 + K(µ) ¡ (1 ¡ F (x)) µ ;
where K(µ) = µ + r=m(µ) > 0: Di¤erentiating with respect to µ obtains
sign(
@Ã(x)
@µ
) = sign(K(µ)2 (1 + K(µ) ¡ K 0(µ)(µ + F (x))) +
+(1 ¡ F (x)) (K(µ)F (x) ¡ µK0(µ)(µ + F (x))): (11)
Letting F (x) ! 0 obtains
sign(
@Ã(x)
@µ
jF (x)!0) = sign(K(µ)(K(µ)
2 ¡ µ2K 0(µ)
K(µ)
+ K(µ) ¡ µK 0(µ))):
Since
K(µ)2 ¡ µ2K 0(µ) = rµ(®
0(µ) + r=µ)
m(µ)2
> 0;
and
K(µ) ¡ µK0(µ) = r®
0(µ)
m(µ)2
> 0;
we have
@Ã(x)
@µ
jF (x)!0> 0:
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On the other hand, when F (x) ! 1,
sign(
@Ã(x)
@µ
jF (x)!1) = sign(K(µ)2(1 + K(µ) ¡ K 0(µ)(µ + 1))):
Since
1 + K(µ) ¡ K0(µ)(µ + 1)) = r(®
0(µ) + ¯0(µ))
m(µ)2
;
@Ã(x)
@µ
jF (x)!1> 0
only if ®0(µ) + ¯0(µ) > 0, so that a negative relationship between wage di¤eren-
tials and market tightness is possible only within the highest skill levels.
In order to get an idea what happens to the overall wage dispersion as market
tighness is increased, let us work through a few numerical examples. Assume
M (u; v) = uzv1¡z with z = :4, so that m (µ) = µ¡:4 = ¯ and ® = µ1¡:4. Assume
a uniform distribution over unit interval; i.e. F (x) = x, where x 2 [0; 1] and
let r = :25. Then the wage di¤erential between the highest and the lowest skill
level yields
w (1) ¡ w(0) =
1Z
0
¡
µ1¡:4 + :25
¢ ¡
µ1¡:4 + xµ¡:4
¢¡
µ1¡:4 + :25
¢2
+ xµ¡:4 £ µ1¡:4 + µ¡:4 £ :25
dx ´ ¢10:
The following table gives numerical values for ¢10 with di¤erent levels of µ:
µ = 0:1 ¢10 = 0:599
µ = 0:3 ¢10 = 0:687
µ = 0:5 ¢10 = 0:737
µ = 1:0 ¢10 = 0:804
µ = 1:5 ¢10 = 0:838
µ = 2:0 ¢10 = 0:859
A.4 Proposition 8
Proof. Denote the ?spread? of a distribution by a parameter ±. For a mean-
preserving spread of the distribution F (x) it holds that
x0Z
x
F±(x; ±)dx ¸ 0, 8x0 2 [x; x] .
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The e¤ect of a mean-preserving spread on the steady state wage dispersion
between the extreme skill levels x and x is given by
x0Z
x
@Ã(x)
@F
F±(x; ±)dx;
which is positive since Ã(x) is incresing and concave in F .
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